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metal workers spontaneously resumed the battle positions abandoned just days before. By nightfall, 150,000 metallos, half the industry's workforce, had occupied their factories. Carried out in a calm and disciplined manner by workers who took a festive view of the novel work stoppage, the strikes at this stage began to affect other trades and regions, taking on the dynamic of a mass movement. Significantly, the movement's extension was neither initiated nor authorized by the CGT leadership but proliferated through contagion, as workers sensed the propitiousness for remedying deep-rooted grievances.
By the time Leon Blum's Popular Front government was installed on June 5, more than a half million French workers were on strike, most ensconced in their factories and work sites. From the first, the new premier resisted rightist demands for force and committed himself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This left employers, who were beginning to fear that the strikes were assuming a revolutionary dimension with little choice but to settle. On the evening of the 7th, government, CGT, and employer representatives drew up what was to be known as the Matignon Agreement, granting union recognition, a hefty wage hike, a system of shop stewards, as well as the principle of the forty-hour week and the two-week paid vacation, both of which the Chamber of Deputies was about to enact. The unprecedented agreement, according French workers rights and benefits enjoyed by no other working class, failed, however, to halt the burgeoning movement. The strike wave in fact continued to swell. By the 9th, the work stoppage embraced two million workers, a quarter of the French working class. While the strikes at this date had extended well beyond the Paris metal industry, its auto, aircraft, and mechanical-engineering workers remained the vanguard of the movement. Every attempt by the CGT Metal Union to persuade these workers to accept a compromise failed, spurring strikers in other sectors. Finally, as the government foundered and the crisis deepened, the top PCF leadership, worried that the strikes were starting to undermine the Popular Front, the centerpiece of its concerns, decided to intervene against them. On the evening of the 1 1th, party chief Maurice Thorez ordered Communists, the only ones with any authority in the occupied plants, to push for a cessation of the conflict.'? The next day, in direct response to Thorez's appeal, delegates from the occupied metal plants agreed to evacuate the factories on the basis of the employers' latest concessions. While the settlement in the Paris metal industry did not immediately halt the movement in other sectors, it signaled the beginning of the end. By the time the remaining conflicts were resolved, well over half the French working class had flocked to the CGT; its unions had been for- ' mally recognized by the employers; and the labor confederation, transformed from a pariah group into a power structure, was henceforth acknowledged as a major player in the nation's affairs.
The Flint occupations (or sit-down strikes) were somewhat different in character but had an analogous effect on labor relations. Prior to the formation of John L. Lewis's Committee of Industrial Organization (CIO) in November 1935, U.S. industrial workers had lacked a true champion and organized labor remained an "arrested movement."" Lewis' CIO changed all this, releasing an energy unknown in U.S. labor history.12 In the summer of 1936, the CIO's United Automobile Workers (UAW) hired fifteen organizers and mobilized several hundred rank-and-file activists in a concerted effort to unionize the auto industry. 13 The principal target of the union's organizing campaign was General Motors (GM), the largest and most important of the auto makers. Like CIO efforts in other industries, the effort in auto focused on the upcoming election.'4 The presidential and state-wide races of 1936 assumed, as a result, a significance similar to the great political mobilizations of the Popular Front. Following the November election, in which Roosevelt won a landslide victory and a pro-labor Democrat, Frank Murphy, captured Michigan's governor's mansion, the organizing campaign began to pay dividends. Buoyed up by the triumph at the polls and the feeling that labor had friends in Washington and Lansing, auto workers began making their way to the UAW. 5 Although still only a fraction of the industry's 500,000 production workers, the union's expanding membership reflected the evolving power relations on the shop floor that came with the CIO's participation in the New Deal. With recruitment on the rise, one movement after another started to convulse the industry. 16 In late November, the first overnight auto occupation occurred at the Bendix Corporation in South Bend, where, after a seven-day struggle, the UAW forced the company union from the plant and won exclusive bargaining rights. This was followed by sit-down strikes at Midland and Kelsey-Hayes in Detroit and at Fisher Body plants in Atlanta and Kansas City. These occupations imbued unionists with the sudden confidence that they had discovered the ultimate organizing weapon. At this point, as "the situation heated up," the UAW asked GM for a "general conference" to discuss a national contract. Unwilling to abandon the open shop, GM referred union officials to local plant managers, refusing to negotiate at the national level. It did not, however, realize that larger forces had shifted against it: By late 1936 the fledgling UAW was buttressed by the considerable resources of the CIO, supported by the ruling party, and equipped with a novel strike weapon against which the corporation had not yet devised a strategy.
Then, on December 28, 1936 at the Cleveland Fisher Body plant, on the 30th at Flint Fisher Body Plant 1, and on the 31st at Flint Fisher Body Plant 2, sitdown strikes were launched in the hope of making the UAW the workers' national bargaining agent.17 In seizing these factories, unionists claimed they were embarking on a struggle that would pit "the CIO against downtown New York," working-class America against the Eastern financial oligarchy.18 But unlike Paris strikers, who also challenged the monied interests in the name of "the people," the sit-downers represented a mere fraction of the workforce. At Fisher Body Plant 1, the heart of the conflict, less than 1,000 of its 7,000 workers participated in the occupation, and of Flint's 43,000 auto workers, barely a tenth belonged to the UAW. In addition to their identification with the New Deal and the union's ascending prospects, these unrepresentative strikers were encouraged and emboldened by their power to cripple the highly integrated circuit of auto production.19 Because the Cleveland and Flint factories were "mother plants," upon which three-quarters of GM's 69 American plants depended for body parts, a small number of strikers was able to exert a force out of all proportion to their actual strength. The ensuing parts shortage consequently forced GM to halt production elsewhere, idling 135,000 of its 150,000 production workers.20 Given that the Cleveland local was strong enough to keep its plant closed without occupying it, the occupation there lasted but a few 17 There is some controversy over whether the Flint workers spontaneously initiated the strike, forcing the UAW to accept their fait accompli, or whether the strike was the result of a premeditated union plan. in Washington and Lansing, who declined to use their police powers and sought a pro-labor resolution of the conflict.
On February 11, after a prolong test of wills in which the union was the last to blink, the UAW finally emerged with an agreement, the first ever negotiated between an American union and a major auto producer. Yet however significant, this was not a categorical victory. GM stopped short of granting exclusive recognition to the UAW; the contract covered only seventeen of GM's sixtynine production facilities; and no significant concessions were made on wages or conditions. The Flint settlement nonetheless prepared the way for both the closed shop at GM and the unionization of other mass-production industries, for the retreat of the world's largest manufacturing concern could not but signal the inevitable decline of managerial hegemony in other sectors. If the genesis of the Paris occupations lay in the Metal Union's prehistory, the same is roughly true of the UAW. As noted above, the Flint strike had been preceded by occupations at Bendix, Midland, and Kelsey-Hayes, all of which validated the tactic for the leadership and sent worker confidence soaring. The sit-down tactic, however, originated neither with the UAW leadership nor its ranks but was borrowed from Akron rubber workers. Like their counterparts in auto, rubber workers were situated in a highly mechanized system of mass production, subject to gruelling speedup, deteriorating conditions, and high rates of unemployment. First in mid-1934, then more seriously in late 1935 and 1936 they began using "quickie sit-downs" to defend victimized unionists and resist eroding standards. Devised to circumvent company violence against picket lines, these strikes, whose effectiveness was almost immediately apparent, soon became a regular feature of labor-management disputes. Not coincidentally, they made a lasting impression on unionists in rubber, a sister industry, where the sit-down would achieve its most consequential application.36
While strike, as I think most labor historians would agree, is ultimately less important than the nature of the organization that sponsors it or the ends to which it is applied.37 The Paris and Flint strikes, representing an aspect of the evolving labor movement as it pursued union goals within the context of the FordistTaylorist factory system, fundamentally differed from the desperate mine occupations of the early 1930s, as well as from the insurgent Russian and Italian occupations of 1917 and 1920. In utilizing the occupation to facilitate industrial unionization, the Paris and Flint strikes took on a significance, a character, and an effect quite unlike anything that had previously occurred and thus deserve to be treated sui generis.
THE HISTORICAL SPECIFICITY OF THE PARIS AND FLINT OCCUPATIONS
Until the era of the sit-down, the mass-production sector, with its highly mechanized and integrated methods of large-scale manufacture and its Taylorist forms of parcelized labor, posed a nearly unsurmountable obstacle to unionization. Traditional craft workers, who still dominated the ranks of organized labor, occupied a secondary tier in the new factories, lacked the labor-market protection that formerly buffered them from employer threats, and had little influence over the production process. More consequentially, the numerous trades and occupations making up the industrial workforce, with their different jurisdictional and workshop concerns, made worker unity unfeasible and industry-wide organization nearly impossible. As a result, auto and metalfabrication plants in the boom years of the 1920s were almost entirely free of union activity. Without the advantages afforded by the sit-down strike-and this gets to the core of my argument-it is doubtful if the labor movement, even after it shifted to an industrial model of unionism, would ever have established itself in the Fordist-Taylorist factory system. Two reasons, I believe, lend credence to this argument. The first relates to the character of the workforce and the nature of the labor process. The Fordist system of production made it difficult for unionists not only to contact those they sought to organize, it tended to employ workers resistant to unionism. The semi-skilled machine-tending and assembly-line workers of the new factories, often of rural or immigrant backgrounds, lacked the trade associations and laboring traditions that had given craftsmen their solidarity and bargaining power; they were recruited from diverse and disparate elements without cultural fragmenting labor processes that nurtured individualistic sensibilities and were subject to social and managerial influences which unionists were powerless to counter.38 In the face of these organizing obstacles, union efforts rarely tran- scended factory-gate speeches or evening meetings, both of which were vulnerable to police raids and company intimidation. French and American unionists throughout the 1920s and the early years of the depression were thus effectively excluded from the mass-production sector, persecuted and blacklisted. The occupation, by contrast, would situate them in the heart of the manufacturing process, profile their visibility, and give workers a greater feeling of strength and security. Barricaded behind the high protective walls of their factory, inspired by a history-making experience, and thrown together in a novel form of collective action, previously diffident workers became primed for recruitment, while employers were powerless to counter union efforts and resume production.39 The second reason the occupation was key to unionization was that industrialists in the mass-production sector, buttressed by richly endowed corporations and linked in various ways with the public powers, were always able to deflect union assaults, while craft organizations and newly founded industrial unions lacked leverage of any sort. There were thus no impediments to the employers' ability to equip their factories with internal systems of security, weed out and victimize potential "trouble-makers," and muster the state's police powers whenever it was necessary to disperse picket lines or introduce non-union labor. Even on those rare occasions when strikes spontaneously broke out-and it was always difficult to shut down the numerous departments of the Fordist factory-employers were able to disperse picket lines, recruit scabs, and continue production. Traditional work stoppages by skilled workers, no longer central to production, or mass walkouts by semi-skilled machine-tenders, who were easily replaceable, were, in these circumstances, without significant effect. Only the sit-down strike, which gave a minority of activists the means to bottleneck the highly integrated processes of Fordist manufacture and bring production to a definitive halt, offered the possibility of balancing the scales in labor's favor. As John L. Lewis put it, "the stay-in strike was beyond a doubt the only method by which the workers . . forces and the difficulties organizing workers, suggest why unionists readily embraced the stay-in strike, they do not explain why it was suddenly possible to carry out such demanding and illegal forms of action. Circumstances, it is important to stress, had to be favorable, for only in situations where the state had been neutralized, employer authority undermined, and workers motivated by rising expectations was the sit-down feasible. Not coincidentally, these contingencies were present in both Popular Front France and New Deal America. graphically dispersed communities, where the relations between work and residence had been severed. Unionists, as a result, had difficulty connecting with them either on the job or in their neighborhoods. 44 While union militants had little to show for their efforts before June 1936, the Communist-led Metal Union did manage to establish the skeleton of a clandestine factory organization in a number of strategically situated Paris plants. Then, when the political climate changed after the legislative elections and the state assumed a neutral, if not supportive stance, these implanted unionists were favorably situated to carry out an exemplary action.45 A few daring occupations, instigated by a handful of militants in several key plants, was practically all it took to enflame the workforce. As these occupations spread in Paris' politically charged Red Belt, metal workers discovered what the elections had made possible and the rest followed almost as a matter of course.46 Encamped in their barricaded factories, there were no picket lines to defend or police to worry about; it was impossible to introduce scab labor; and the "sit-down community" fostered forms of solidarity invulnerable to outside pressure. At this point, union organizers were able to enter the plants and recruit their workforces, which had quite literally become captive audiences. This is not to argue that the metal occupations suddenly instilled strikers with syndicalist principles and sentiments, but the novel experience did create a situation in which inaccessible workers-formally cowed by authoritarian social relations, isolated by fragmenting technologies, and divided by various ascriptive differences-became accessible and recruitable. 47 Although the Flint occupations lacked the massive, spontaneous character of the Paris strikes, the obstacles confronting UAW unionists and the means by which they overcame them were nearly identical. Management at GM and throughout the auto industry had long kept the unions out of the plants, even after Roosevelt's first Administration had set up a legal framework for collective bargaining and developed the bureaucratic machinery to adjudicate labormanagement disputes. American auto workers were also subject to the same alienating technologies affecting Paris metal workers, divided by similar ascriptive differences, and equally difficult to reach. was the election euphoria and Roosevelt's pro-labor neutrality that gave the UAW unionists the opportunity to launch the occupations. Without fear of state interference, they realized that the interdependent nature of Fordist production made GM prone to such strikes, that by tying up a few strategic departments, they could force the closing of an entire factory, and that if a shut-down occurred in a key plant, it would threaten the entire corporate system. In the words of one Detroit auto worker: "Put a crimp in the belt at one spot and the whole belt freezes."49 As union-instigated strikes in Cleveland and Flint put a crimp in the GM system and forced the closing of other production facilities, unionists had only to mobilize a minority of strategically situated workers to freeze the entire system. This gave them a bargaining lever different from the mass upheaval in the Paris metal industry, but one that worked to similar effect. Moreover, as in the French case, the Flint occupation enabled unionists to turn the massive complexity of the Fordist factory system against management, preventing it from attacking strikers, recruiting scabs, or resuming operation.50 closed off immigration (then the world's highest) , discouraged rural migrants, limited the access of women and youth, curbed turnover, gave married men and skilled workers a preference in employment, and helped, for the first time in a generation, to homogenize the workforce. As metal workers became "more French, more skilled, more mature, more urban, and more stable," they not only began to see themselves as a collectivity in need of representation, they were better able to forge those ties necessary for collective struggle.57 The depression, in a word, increased worker complaint, as well as the possibility for labor action. But there was another, equally consequential economic factor at work. In response to the rise of Hitler, the French state in mid-1934 began rearming. The Paris metal industry, particularly its auto, aviation, and mechanical-engineering sectors, constituted the principal beneficiary of the government's rearmament program. By 1935, the trough in unemployment had bottomed out, hours increased, and metal workers experienced a gradually improving job market. Combined with the on-going republican mobilizations in the streets, the economic upswing did much to heighten workers'confidence and stiffen their will to struggle.58
In the United States, a comparable set of circumstances surrounded the GM strike. The genteel opportunist elected in 1932 was wont to portray himself as "the greatest friend that labor ever had," but as Francis Perkins' naively revealing account indicates, Roosevelt had no specific plan to empower the unions and remained oriented to alliances with powerful interest groups supportive of the Democratic party.59 The famous Section 7a of the Mussoliniinspired National Industrial Recovery Act recognizing labor's right to bargain was a mere afterthought, and Roosevelt was content to allow company unions to act as the workers' designated representative, except in cases where already powerful unions, like the United Mine Workers or the Ladies Garment Workers, were able to impose their will.60 While the surge in union recruitment and Originating in the auto and metal-fabricating works of the Paris Region, the French strikes were largely spontaneous in character and national in dimension; they were entirely peaceful; they encompassed a majority of workers in the new mass-production industries; and they pursued diffused, often unspecified goals, although union recognition was foremost among them. The GM strike, by contrast, was almost entirely union-controlled and local in dimension, even if it ultimately affected a greater number of workers in different parts of the country; it also involved a minority of the workforce and limited itself to specific union demands. Despite these admittedly significant differences, the Paris and Flint occupations appealed to similar types of workers, who had been without representation and burdened by similar grievances; they were supported by a comparable array of economic and political forces that allowed the strikers to engage in what were normally illegal forms of action; and these workers were instigated by small groups of militants willing to use radical methods but limit themselves to goals wholly compatible with existing institutional arrangements. These similarities, in my view, suggest that the two occupations were essentially a response to organizational challenges which conventional union practices had failed to meet. The extreme concentration of employer power, the inauspicious nature of Fordist-Taylorist production, the weakness of the labor movement, and the ineffectiveness of traditional actions meant that the only way unionists could possibly organize the mass-production sector and win collective bargaining rights was by employing radical and innovative methods. 
